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Summary
Disorientation is a common phenomenon in delirium and
amnesia. It is thought to have an obvious explanation, i.e.
disoriented patients fail to store the information crucial for
the maintenance of orientation. In this study, we explored
whether disorientation was indeed associated with a failure
to learn new information or rather with a confusion of
information within memory. Twenty-one patients with severe
amnesia were examined. Orientation was tested with a 20-
item questionnaire. Two runs of a continuous recognition
task were used to test the ability to acquire information (first
run of the task) and the tendency to confuse the temporal
context of information acquisition (comparison of the second
with the first run). We found that orientation was much
better predicted by the measure of temporal context confusion
(r = 0.90) than by the ability to simply acquire information
(r = 0.54). Superimposition of neuroradiological scans
demonstrated that increased temporal context confusion was
associated with medial orbitofrontal or basal forebrain
damage; patients with normal levels of temporal context
confusion did not have damage to these areas. We conclude
that disorientation more often indicates a confusion of
memory traces from different events, i.e. increased temporal
context confusion, than an inability to learn new information.
Disorientation appears to reflect primarily a failure of the
orbitofrontal contribution to memory.
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Introduction
Disorientation to time, place and situation, rarely also to
person, is a common finding in clinical practice.
Disorientation is a regular component of acute confusional
states (delirium) (Horenstein et at., 1967; Chedru and
Geschwind, 1972; Mesulam et al., 1976; Devinsky et al.,
1988) and is sometimes present in dementia (Cummings and
Benson, 1992) and amnesia. The mechanism of disorientation
appears to be obvious: clinical wisdom holds that disoriented
subjects cannot store new information and therefore fail to
continuously update their knowledge about time and the
environment (Benton et al., 1964; High et al., 1990).
However, there is an alternative possibility as schematized
in Fig. 1: normal memory function demands not only that
information has been stored but also that the temporal
order among pieces of information is maintained (Fig. 1A).
Disorientation might not only ensue from a failure to simply
store information (Fig. IB) but also, and possibly more so,
if a subject did store information, but confused the temporal
sequence of information within memory (Fig. 1C) (Von
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Cramon and Saring, 1982; Baddeley and Hitch, 1993). This
would make it difficult to realize what piece of stored
information pertained to the present situation. In a recent study
we found that.this type of memory failure sets spontaneously
confabulating patients apart from other amnestic patients
(Schnider et al., 1996ft).
(A) (B)
Fig. 1 Types of memory failure: schema illustrating (A) normal
storage of both item and temporal sequence information in
memory, (B) failure to retain new information in memory; and
(C) confusion of the temporal sequence of information acquisition
within memory despite storage of the information itself.
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In the present study we explored the possibility that
disorientation in amnesia is associated with a failure to learn
new information or an increased tendency to confuse the
temporal context of information acquisition. Because we
looked for a common mechanism of disorientation, patients
were included irrespective of the aetiology of their amnesia.
Patients and methods
Twenty-one amnestic patients hospitalized for neuro-
psychological rehabilitation participated in the study. Aeti-
ologies of amnesia were as follows: traumatic brain injury
(n = 8); haemorrhage and surgery of an aneurysm of the
anterior communicating artery (n = 5) or right posterior
communicating artery (n = 2); herpes simplex encephalitis
(n = 2); surgery of an invasive left olfactory meningioma
(n = 1); Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome (n = 1); right frontal
haemorrhage (n = 1); left thalamic infarction (n = 1). All
patients' amnesia was evident in everyday behaviour and
was confirmed with several memory tests as documented in
our previous study (Schnider et al., 1996i>). However, patient
selection was based on performance in the California Verbal
Learning test (CVLT; Delis et al, 1987). Because all patients
finally judged as disoriented had a long delay free recall (of
=£4 in the CVLT, only patients with similarly deficient
recall were included. All patients were mobile on the ward
throughout the day. Only patients who had been in our unit
for at least 2 weeks were included to ensure that all patients
had been living in a similar setting and had thus received a
similar amount of information to help orientation. Patients
were excluded if they had insufficient attention (digit span
<5) or another cognitive deficit precluding participation in
the experiment (e.g. aphasia, visual agnosia). The tests
reported here were performed 75±55 (17-270) days after
the occurrence of brain damage. Fifteen age- and education-
matched controls with no history of neurological or psychi-
atric illness (mostly family members of patients) were also
tested. All subjects gave their informed consent to being
tested.
Orientation
The orientation test described by Von Cramon and Saring
(1982) was used. This is in the form of a questionnaire
designed for German speaking subjects. It contains questions
that are particularly appropriate for hospitalized patients
and comprises five questions for each of four domains of
orientation: (i) orientation to person: name, age, profession,
citizenship, eye colour; (ii) orientation to place: city, name
of building, unit or floor, approximate direction of home
town, county; (iii) orientation to situation: reason for being
here, type of treatment, sources of support, name of a
person on the ward, party covering the costs of the sojourn;
(iv) orientation to time: day of the week, date, month, year,
time. A correctly oriented subject will give at least four
correct answers for domains (i) to (iii) and at least three
correct answers for domain (iv). The total number of correct
answers is 2=15 in correctly oriented subjects (Von Cramon
and Saring, 1982).
Item recognition, temporal context confusion
(experiment)
Free recall ('Do you remember the words that I told you
before?') requires both that the demanded information has
been stored and that it can be retrieved from memory. All
patients in this study failed to recall previously learned words.
Pure information storage is better reflected by the ability to
recognize previously learned information (Lezak, 1995).
Since this study aimed to juxtapose the impact of failed
storage of information and of increased confusion of the
temporal context of information acquisition on disorientation,
it was desirable to test temporal context confusion with a
recognition task too, so that the two processes could be
directly compared. The following experiment, which was
more extensively discussed in a previous article (Schnider
et al., 1996fo), tested both processes with two components of
the same recognition task:
Run 1: item recognition (IR)
To test pure information storage, a continuous recognition
task of design similar to the recognition tests of Sturm and
Willmes (1995) for nonsense stimuli was composed with
120 meaningful, concrete drawings from Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980). The picture series consisted of six series
with 20 pictures each. Each series contained eight items that
appeared in all six series (thus, they were repeated five times
after initial presentation) and 12 distracter items that were
not repeated in other series. Each picture was presented on
a computer screen for 2 s. For each picture the subjects were
requested to answer the question: 'Have you already seen
precisely this picture in this run?'. Answers were recorded
by the examiner pressing the appropriate response key and
immediately followed by presentation of the next picture.
According to Sturm and Willmes (1995), the item recognition
score was calculated as: IR = hits - false positives. The
maximum score was therefore 40 (40 hits, no false positives).
Run 2: temporal context confusion (TCC)
One hour after the recognition task (run 1), a second run
was made with precisely the same design. For this run, target
items were replaced so that eight distracter items from the
first run now served as the target items, while the target
items from the first run now ranked among the distracters.
Subjects were instructed to 'forget that [they] had already
taken a similar test before' and were requested to answer the
question: 'Have you already seen precisely this picture in
this run?' for each picture. The central idea behind the
experiment was that false familiarity with a distracter item
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Fig. 2 Amnestic patients' association of total orientation score (Z-ORI) with (A) item recognition (IR)
and (B) the temporal context confusion (TCC). Open circles indicate patients with IR in the chance
range; in these patients, TCC was not determined. The dashed horizontal lines separate patients with
disorientation in at least one domain from normally oriented amnesties. The bars in the lower left
corners indicate the controls' range of performance (maximal to minimal values) and the controls'
mean.
Table 1 Association of orientation scores with item














Association of orientation scores with IR and TCC. Numbers
indicate second order polynomial regression coefficients.
Orientation measures: I-ORI = total orientation score; TIME-
ORI = time orientation score; PLACE-ORI = orientation to place
score; SIT-ORI = orientation to situation score. Significance
levels: *0.05 >P> 0.01; **0.01 **P> 0.0001; ***P =s 0.0001.
(i.e. a false positive response) was based on an inability to
distinguish between the item's previous occurrence in the
first rather than the second run (irrespective of whether it
has been a target or a distracter in the first run), i.e. on
temporal context confusion (TCC). Thus, TCC was defined
as the relatiev increase of false positives in the second over
the first run, i.e. TCC = (FP2/ Hits2) - (FP, / Hits,), where
FPj and FP2 = false positives in run 1 and 2, respectively;
HitS] and Hit2 = hits in run 1 and 2, respectively. Since this
experiment could measure temporal context confusion only
if a subject was able to store information at all, run 2 was
made only with subjects who had performed significantly
above chance in run 1 (a" > 1.64, Brophy, 1986). Two
patients with herpes simplex encephalitis and one patient
with traumatic brain injury did not meet this criterion.
Lesion analysis
Most patients had several CT scans. An MRI was available
for four patients. An attempt was made to account for the
different lesion types: in patients with traumatic brain injury,
all haemorrhagic lesions visible in the early scans (after
removal of subdural or epidural haematomas in two patients)
were taken into account because each parenchymal
haemorrhage is likely to indicate an area of axonal damage
(Eisenberg and Levin, 1989). Lesions were also taken into
account if they were subsequently invisible in later scans.
With all other aetiologies, the scan performed closest in time
to our experiment was analysed to prevent overestimation of
the lesion area due to perifocal oedema. Lesions were
reconstructed with the templates of Damasio and Damasio
(1989) and referred to a composite axial slice containing the
hippocampus, amygdala and basal forebrain and to the
midsagittal plane (see Fig. 3). The lesion areas were
superimposed in a commercial drawing program. Four
patients had CT and MRI scans with no visible focal
brain lesion (clipping of an anterior communicating artery
aneurysm, n = 1; Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, n = 1;
traumatic brain injury, n = 2).
Results
Amnesties versus controls
Figure 2 shows the performances of the patients and controls.
Item recognition discriminated much better between
amnesties and controls (f(34) = 4.2, P = 0.0002; Fig. 2A)
than TCC (r(31) = 1.9, P = 0.06; Fig. 2B). The IR and
TCC scores were not significantly correlated (P > 0.05)
either in the controls (r = -0.48) nor in the amnesties
(r = -0.28).
Determinants of disorientation
Eleven patients were disoriented to time, place and situation,
three patients were disoriented only to time, and seven
patients were normally oriented. The following analysis was
limited to the amnesties to determine the contribution of IR
and TCC to disorientation. Because all patients were oriented
to person, this domain of orientation was omitted from further
analysis. Highest regression coefficients with orientation
scores were obtained using second order polynomial














Fig. 3 Lesion reconstruction showing the projection of lesions to the midsagittal plane and a combined
axial plane encompassing the hippocampus (H), the amygdala (A), and the orbitofrontal area (including
basal forebrain, F) as indicated in the upper left design. Patients are separated according to whether
their item recognition and temporal context confusion were within ('normal') or outside the controls'
range ('impaired' IR, 'increased' TCC). In the sagittal plane, shaded areas indicate lesions close to the
midline, empty polygons with dashed lines indicate lateral hemispheric lesions, 'n' indicates the number
of patients in the respective group.
regression rather than simple regression. All domains of
orientation were much better predicted by TCC than by IR
(see Fig. 2 and Table 1).
The total number of correct answers (Z-ORI in Table 1)
did not significantly correlate with the following parameters:
days after brain injury (r = 0.23), age (r = -0.06), number
of years at school (r = -0.08); or with several measures of
frontal lobe function: verbal fluency (Thurstone and
Thurstone, 1963), r = 0.29; figural fluency (Regard et al.,
1982), r = -0.20; colour-word interference (Stroop, 1935),
r = 0.14.
Lesion analysis
Patients were separated according to whether their IR and
TCC were within or outside the range of the controls. By
accepting this broad range of 'normality', classification in
the 'impaired' group has a high specificity for true impairment
while there is a risk that some patients with a true impairment
would be classified as 'normal'. This was the case with three
amnestic patients who scored in the 'normal' range on both
IR and TCC. The three patients with chance IR scores were
excluded from this analysis because their TCC was not
determined. Patients with increased TCC and normal IR
(n = 2) had medial orbitofrontal lesions sparing the basal
forebrain (Fig. 3). Patients with impaired IR but normal
TCC (n = 5) had diverse lesions sparing both the medial
orbitofrontal cortex and the basal forebrain. Patients with
both impaired IR and increased TCC (n = 4) had lesions
that mostly involved the basal forebrain.
Discussion
Our results indicate that disorientation in amnesia is based
primarily on a confusion of information within memory
rather than a lack of stored information. Although severe
failure to store new information was associated with
disorientation, increased temporal context confusion predicted
disorientation much better (Table 1 and Fig. 2). Although
correlations do not prove a causal link, our study strongly
suggests such a link: first, this study prospectively tested the
possibility that the two examined mechanisms of memory
contributed to orientation, a possibility which was a priori
reasonable; secondly, other measures of frontal lobe function
did not correlate with orientation, indicating a specificity of
temporal context confusion.
It has been surmised that disorientation after brain damage
reflects anterograde and retrograde amnesia (Benton et al.,
1964; High et al., 1990), i.e. an insufficient amount of
information in memory to maintain orientation (Fig. IB).
This explanation cannot account for the observation that
disoriented patients' responses to questions of orientation
may vary from one interview to another; the answers may
be correct at one time and wrong at other times (Daniel
et al, 1987). Our results suggest that the main problem of
disoriented patients is a confusion of memory traces from
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diverse events rather than a lack of information in memory.
While a healthy person normally has a feeling for the recent
flow of information and does not have any difficulty in
realizing what acquired knowledge refers to the present
(Fig. 1A), a disoriented patient may be unable to distinguish
intuitively between knowledge acquired some minutes ago
and knowledge acquired some days, months, or even years
ago (Fig. 1C). The patient may therefore confuse the date,
place and the reason of his being in a particular place and
his responses may vary from one occasion to the other.
Incorrect responses to questions of orientation may reflect a
subject's problem in selecting the currently correct answer
from memory rather than a lack of this knowledge.
This study was designed to seek a common mechanism of
disorientation in amnesia and therefore included patients with
diverse types of brain damage. Certain aetiologies of amnesia
were not represented in our study group. Notwithstanding
these caveats, our data suggest that increased temporal
context confusion emanates from prefrontal, especially medial
orbitofrontal, damage or disconnection. Conversely, a
decreased capacity to store and subsequently recognize new
information appears to have less anatomical specificity as it
may result from lesions in diverse locations (Fig. 3). Basal
forebrain lesions appear typically to produce a combination
of these two types of memory failure. Our finding of a
functional and anatomical dissociation between item
recognition failure and temporal context confusion is in
agreement with earlier studies on temporal order recognition
(Squire, 1982; Milner et al., 1985; Hunkin and Parkin, 1993).
Our study does not definitively determine whether
increased temporal context confusion reflects a failure of the
process of information storage or information retrieval. In
our opinion, defective retrieval is unlikely because it would
similarly affect recollection of recent and remote information.
However, many disoriented patients and many patients with
spontaneous confabulations—which are also accounted for
by increased temporal context confusion (Schnider et al.,
1996b)—readily give precise accounts of remote events
(Schnider et al., 1996a). We suggest that increased temporal
context confusion is mainly due to a specific defect of
information storage, i.e. a failure to co-encode temporal
order information. Temporal order information should not be
conceived of as separate from item information but rather in
terms of the saliency that recent information may attain in
memory, as schematized in Fig. 1. This saliency, which
distinguishes recent from remote information, may be
determined by the behavioural relevance attributed to new
information (Schnider et al., 1996a). Neurons in the
orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to react specifically to
stimuli of behavioural significance (Rosenkilde et al., 1981).
We have previously suggested that defective temporal
labelling of information, resulting in increased temporal
context confusion, may result from damage of the circuit
connecting the amygdala, the dorsomedial thalamic nucleus,
and the orbitofrontal cortex, whereas failed retention of
information in memory, resulting in defective item
recognition, may result from an interruption of the classic
Papez circuit, i.e. the circuit connecting the hippocampus
with the anterior thalamic nucleus (Schnider et al., 1996a).
Both circuits have multiple, spatially close connections in the
anteromedial thalamus (e.g. mamillo-thalamic tract, ventral
amygdalo-fugal pathways) and basal forebrain (e.g. septum
verum, ventral striatum); a lesion in this area may thus
interrupt either limbic circuit and produce either type of
memory failure.
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